Lancashire Combined Fire Authority

Audit Committee

Meeting to be held on 26 March 2026

Risk Management                                               

Appendix A - Risk Matrix

Contact for further information – Esma Alicehajic, Senior Business Continuity and Emergency Planning Officer

Tel: 01772 866 6874

Executive Summary

Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS) continues to strengthen its approach to organisational risk, aligning policy and practice with International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) 31000:2018 and National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) sector guidance. Risk management remains embedded within quarterly Executive Board and Corporate Performance Board discussions, enabling ongoing scrutiny, targeted mitigation, and informed decision-making.

The Corporate Risk Register reflects a stable overall position, with some movement during the reporting period. Notably, the loss of funding risk (2a) has reduced following increased funding certainty and is no longer within the priority reduction zone. As a result, retention and recruitment of on-call staff and the replacement of the existing mobilising system remain the most significant areas of organisational exposure.

The Service continues to monitor internal, national, and geopolitical developments that may impact risk exposure or service delivery, with any material changes incorporated into the Corporate Risk Register through established processes.

Recommendation(s)

The Audit Committee is requested to:

· Endorse the Service’s current risk management arrangements, and

· Note the latest position reflected in the Corporate Risk Matrix and Register.

Overview

The Audit Committee provides independent assurance on the adequacy of the Service’s risk management, internal control environment, and governance arrangements. Risk management remains a core component of organisational resilience, ensuring Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS) can anticipate, prevent, or respond effectively to events that may impact operational delivery, strategic objectives, financial sustainability, or reputation.

The Service continues to operate a tiered model for risk identification and escalation, with departmental risk registers informing discussion at Corporate Programme Board and Executive Board. Risks demonstrating wider organisational implications or thresholds beyond local tolerance are escalated to the Corporate Risk Register.

Current Risk Profile

There has been some movement in the risk landscape. Following the three-year funding settlement the funding risk has reduced and leaves two risks that continue to represent the most significant areas of exposure for the organisation: retention and recruitment of on-call staff, and the replacement of the existing mobilising system. These risks remain elevated due to the influence of long-term external factors and wider sector pressures, rather than deterioration in internal conditions. The following changes in the Corporate Risks since the December meeting are set out below:

Increased Risks

Risk	Description
1a – Loss of staff due to industrial action	A rise in likelihood, driven by a more uncertain national industrial relations environment. External factors such as evolving employment legislation, future pay award pressures, and emerging national narratives around fire service resourcing increase the probability of dispute activity.
11j – Failing pager messages	An increase in this risk reflects a temporary rise in likelihood during the transition to new mobilisation ways of working, including greater reliance on pagers following local changes. While mitigations are in place (including app-based fallback, North West Fire Control (NWFC) escalation processes, targeted connectivity improvements, and structured testing), early-stage reliability concerns increase the chance of delayed or missed alerts.

Decreased Risks

Risk	Description
11b – Complete removal of Day Crew Plus (DCP) duty system	The decrease in this risk reflects a reduction in impact, linked to improved stability and embedding of current duty system arrangements following the Emergency Cover Review (ECR) changes. While the risk remains relevant due to the potential for future challenge, the operational and organisational consequences of removal are now assessed as less severe than previously, given greater clarity on alternative staffing models, increased organisational readiness, and improved understanding of workforce and service delivery implications
12a - Major lack of effective Management of personal data	The decrease in this risk reflects a reduction in likelihood following strengthening of information governance controls. Improvements including dedicated data protection capacity, clearer ownership, increased training and awareness, and more routine oversight have reduced the probability of a significant data management failure.
2a – Loss of funding	This risk has reduced from red to amber due to a decrease in likelihood following greater funding certainty provided through the recent three-year Spending Review settlement, completion of the Fair Funding Review and Business Rates Reset. While the outcome confirms real-terms reductions and a defined savings requirement within the agreed Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), the provision of a multi-year settlement significantly reduces short-term volatility and uncertainty. The Service now has clearer financial parameters within which to plan, including an agreed savings profile and balanced MTFS, enabling structured mitigation and forward planning.

Although not currently reflected in the Corporate Risk Register, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East is being monitored as an emerging risk given its potential to indirectly influence several existing corporate risks. Recent geopolitical developments have already contributed to market volatility and supply‑chain uncertainty, with national commentators noting potential impacts on inflation, global markets and economic stability, alongside increased security concerns, and wider public‑sector pressures. These factors may elevate our exposure in areas such as cost inflation, business continuity, procurement, fuel availability, and broader organisational resilience. We continue to horizon‑scan these developments through established risk management processes, and any material change in risk likelihood or impact will be assessed and incorporated into the Corporate Risk Register in line with LFRS’ risk management procedure.

More broadly, the risk landscape continues to be influenced by national themes including sector culture, professional standards, regulatory scrutiny, and public expectation. While these factors have not resulted in scoring changes this period, they remain relevant contextual considerations when interpreting overall exposure.

Overall, the risk landscape remains consistent and well-controlled, with targeted adjustments reflecting operational change, sector context, and maturing mitigation rather than new or escalating threats.

Progress Against Internal Audit Recommendations

Following the internal audit of the Service’s risk management framework, which provided a reasonable level of assurance, work is ongoing to address the three agreed areas of development: training, risk register consistency, and reporting.

Progress to date has focused on identifying the most effective and proportionate approach to risk management training for risk owners and members, alongside improving consistency in action setting, review, and reporting across risk registers. This includes alignment with emerging national approaches within the fire sector to support standardisation and continued maturity.

Implementation remains on track, with delivery of these improvements forming part of the Service’s wider risk maturity trajectory towards April 2026. As part of the next review cycle, the Service will also look to further align its approach with HM Treasury’s Orange Book: Management of Risk – Principles and Concepts, ensuring continued alignment with recognised best practice.

Business risk

Failure to maintain an effective risk management system could result in significant operational, financial, legal, and reputational impacts, and undermine the Service’s ability to meet statutory duties and strategic objectives.

Sustainability or Environmental Impact

There are no identified impacts on sustainability or the environment.

Equality and Diversity Implications

There are no identified implications on equality and diversity.

General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

Will the proposal(s) involve the processing of personal data?  N

Human Resource (HR) implications

Improved consistency, governance, and reporting will support managers in managing risks proactively, reducing the likelihood of impact on personnel and improving decision-making confidence.

Financial implications

The risk management system supports financial planning, value-for-money assessments, and cost-benefit considerations linked to mitigation and acceptance of risk.

Legal implications

Well-governed risk management ensures compliance with the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and strengthens organisational assurance in relation to scrutiny and accountability frameworks.

Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985

List of background papers

Paper:

Date:

Contact:

Appendix A: Corporate Risk Matrix and Summary Register

Appendix A

Corporate Risk Matrix and Summary Register

Risk ID	Sub Risk ID	Risk Cause	Triggers	Actions
1		Loss or lack of staff due to…	A widespread event or situation that leads to a significant loss of workforce ability to undertake normal business	1) Continue monitoring of the Unions' position on current and future potential disputes 2) Changes in operational response models and monitoring of the Unions' position, including the upcoming Service Review                                   3) Develop options paper in relation to consideration of the employment of a resilience workforce                                 4) Continue to review, update and test Business Continuity Plan(s) (BCP) relating to Industrial Action (IA) in line with testing schedule or upon increased likelihood 5) Continue reviewing and updating costing of IA operations in line with current economic situation       6) Exercise and test resilience model      7) Consider financial implication of resilience model aligned to MTFS 8) Complete and follow up any recommendations that come from the National Resilience (NR) IA survey
	1a	Industrial Action	A local or national dispute with a major or multiple unions leading to staff undertaking partial performance or withdrawal of labour	1) Continue monitoring of the Unions' position on current and future potential disputes 2) Changes in operational response models and monitoring of the Unions' position, including the upcoming Service Review                                   3) Develop options paper in relation to consideration of the employment of a resilience workforce                                 4) Continue to review, update and test BCPs relating to IA in line with testing schedule or upon increased likelihood  5) Continue reviewing and updating costing of IA operations in line with current economic situation      6) Exercise and test resilience model      7) Consider financial implication of resilience model aligned to MTFS 8) Complete and follow up any recommendations that come from the NR IA survey
	1b	Inability to recruit or retain key staff	Decline in available workforce due to a number of factors a. long term illnesses b. high level of retirement c. Service cannot offer competitive salary d. poor levels of recruitment due to social, or financial pressures and capacity of current workforce to undertake promotion processes e. perception of service and culture discouraging applications  f. ineffective recruitment programme	1) Continue to monitor through Workforce Planning arrangements 2) Raise any shortfalls through Group Managers Meeting or Executive Board as applicable 3) Evaluate the success of recruitment sources 4) Financial pressures to be considered as part of workforce planning
	1c	Inability to provide sufficient staff in leadership roles	a. The ECR, delivered in 2024, resulted in an increase in the number of supervisory roles available                                                  b. The historical retirement profile has resulted in a large number of promotions over the years resulting in a reduced pool of staff available for promotion.	1) The Service continues to offer leadership development to supervisory and middle managers 2) Advertise leadership vacancies externally
	1d	Pandemic/ill-health epidemic	An ill-health epidemic or pandemic reducing ability of staff to attend or access to workplace, either due to their own illness, to prevent or reduce transmission and to care for dependants	1) Continuation of updating relevant plans and Health and Safety (H&S) information in line with newest developments and research 2) Explore the possibility of developing an early warning trigger mechanism from HR to inform Response and Emergency Planning (REP) action/monitoring on potential increases sickness and absences, by end of quarter 4 3) Combine learnings from COVID, Pegasus, and LFRS BC Senior Management Team (SMT) exercise, tracked through LFRS Assurance Management System (AMS), by end of quarter 4
2		Financial Pressures	Insufficient funding or unbudgeted cost pressures that financial sustainability and ability to maintain critical functions
	2a	Loss of funding	a. Government reduction of grant monies affecting income b. Change in Fair Funding Formula or Business Rates Retention impacting on LFRS share of funding c. Change in local or national economic circumstances resulting in reductions in Council Tax or Business Rates	1) Continue lobbying Government through local Members and Member(s) of Parliament (MP) 2) Responding to consultations
	2b	Overspending and future financial pressures on MTFS due to increase in costs of goods and services and pay	a. Unexpected event that leads to rise in costs for goods and services and pay e.g. Fuel costs due to Ukraine war, Global recession b. higher than budgeted pay award	1) Regular monitoring and updating MTFS assumptions
	2c	Future financial pressures on MTFS due to changes in legislation	a. Changes in building regulations resulting in higher costs than in our MTFS assumptions i.e. BREEM regulations b. New environmental targets resulting in increased costs in the future i.e. Net zero targets	1) Continue to monitor potential impact, incorporating in our draft MTFS 2) Continue to regularly review any potential changes. 3) Review of outcomes of the spending review, funding consultations, and Autumn budget
	2d	Emerging risk associated with grey book pensions and overspending due to increase in costs and administrations associated with changes to pensions	a. Unexpected changes to the pension schemes due to court rulings.	1) Follow government guidance and legislative changes in relation to individual cases 2) Record rationale for decision making 3) Provide regular updates to Pension Board and Resources Committee
3		Loss of Utilities	An event or situation, malicious or non-malicious, that causes a partial or total loss of a utilities services
	3a	Telecommunications	Severe weather, Space weather, failure of equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local telecoms infrastructure at LFRS and/or North West Fire Control (NWFC). This could also be due to loss or withdrawal of contracts from suppliers.	1) Participating in NWFC Business Continuity (BC) group to address the communication backups 2) Operation Exercise Blackout recommendations implementation 3) Establishing a Basic Connect license for LFRS
	3b (i)	Power outage - Generally	Severe weather, space weather, failure of equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local power infrastructure or supply chains. Local or national demand is above capacity leading to Rota load disconnections etc.	1) Drafting of a power outage Tactical BCP informed by outcome of Business Continuity Management Group (BCMG) workshops - by Quarter 1 (Q1)/26-27 2) Conduct a cost benefit analysis of strategically locating the mobile generators across Lancashire - by Q1 - 26/27 3) Produce an appendices to Station BCP for guidance in relation to use of generators - Q1-26/27
	3b (ii)	Power outage - Service Headquarters (SHQ)	Severe weather, space weather, failure of equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local power infrastructure or supply chains. Local or national demand is above capacity leading to Rota load disconnections etc.	1) ICT to review condition and provide report of Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) to main server room- Q1- 26/27 2) Property to review / discuss any recommended works/ actions by the generator contractor - Q1- 26/27
	3b (iii)	Power outage - Leadership & Development Centre (LDC)	Severe weather, space weather, failure of equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local power infrastructure or supply chains. Local or national demand is above capacity leading to Rota load disconnections etc.	1) Isolation of Photovoltaic (PV) panels on H54 - requires further investigation to resolve back feed to the generator issues   2) Electrical infrastructure upgrades and resilience to be part of project scope for the development of the site 3) Implementation of the recommendations from the LDC remedial power outage Incident 2024. (under review)
	3c	Water	Large scale failure of water company equipment due to fault or malicious attack on national or local processing and pumping infrastructure or supply chains, or failure of private company.	1) Conduct a gap analysis on water outage on a county-wide scale, including bottled drinking water, firefighting water, and hygiene requirements 2) Consider service delivery and training requirements to reduce water needs as required 3) Investigate multiagency reciprocal agreements
	3d	Fuel	Failure of equipment due to fault, incident, industrial action, or malicious attack on national or local infrastructure or supply chains. Geopolitical issues affecting access to fuel from international sources. Public behaviour (panic buying as a result of any of above scenarios)	1) Maintain a minimum level of fuel (75%) in bulk storage 2) Light vehicle review - diversification of fleet - through operational demands on station relating to different activities requiring a variety of vehicle types from a standard saloon to a 4x4 and alternative powered vehicles, by end of Quarter 4 (Q4) 3) Analyse third party power supply into stations report for the next step into introducing electrification and implement recommendations, by end of Q4
4		Loss of Information and Communications Technology (ICT)	Partial or total loss of physical or electronic/virtual ICT systems due to a fault, accidental damage, or malicious attack.
	4a	Cyber Security	Partial or total loss of electronic/virtual ICT systems due to a malicious attack.	1) A Cyber Security Strategy approved by Exec board that includes things like additional managed services to assist with monitoring the environment, Investment in next generation perimeter defences such as next generation Firewalls and changed to working practice, such as enforcing more secure password and multi factor authentication 2) Aligning with the National Cyber Security Centre best practice security framework and will continue to do so as that develops 3) Incident Response Retainer, having a specialist company on call for potential incidents 4) Introduction on a Managed Detection and Response (MDR) solution 5) Investment into the LRF and resiliency forum 6) Dedicated Cyber Security Role
	4b	Failure of key ICT systems	Partial or total loss of physical or electronic/virtual ICT systems due to a fault, accidental damage, or malicious attack	1) Identify pathway to Azure migrate for data, storage & infrastructure 2) Exploit cloud-based security controls and increase secure score across subscriptions 3) Monthly data backups to offline storage with airgap 4) Re-Architecture of elements of the network with our new Firewall Refresh increasing resiliency and security. 5) further investment to migrate virtual on-premises systems to cloud based services, which should include Citrix and VMware
5		Death or Serious injury of…	An incident that causes the death or serious injury of a person either in or interacting with the Service
	5a	A member of staff or contractor during work activities	An incident in the workplace related to general duties e.g. a member of staff involved in Road Traffic Collision (RTC) whilst undertaking duties, slips trips and falls	1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor
	5b	A member of staff during operational activities	An incident enroute to, on an incident ground or in operational training scenario e.g. falling debris	1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor
	5c	A member of the public due to Service activities	An incident or situation that leads to the death or serious injury of a member of the public. During operational response, training activities or any other public interaction, or incident on Service premises  OR Failure to appropriately assess, inform or safeguard the public from hazards and risks associated with fires	1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor
	5d	Death of member of staff, visitor, or contractor due to on service premises	An incident or situation on service premises or estate that leads to death or serious injury. Failure to provide appropriate risk assessment, first aid provision/ training, damaged or faulty equipment or buildings/structures	1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor
	5e	Failure to identify and implement learning from past events.	Failure to properly investigate and implement actions following recommendations, from a near miss, death, or serious injury to mitigate risk for the future	1) In March 2024, the Health and Safety and Environmental Management Systems underwent an independent audit as part of our ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 certification process. No non-conformances were identified with one opportunity for improvement suggested by the auditor
6		Change in national legislation requiring additional workloads to assess implement and embed.	Change in national legislation requiring additional workloads, this might be due to a significant event requiring learning, new government initiatives or change in political landscape
	6a	Changes to Emergency Response Driver Training	Change in Fire Standard for Emergency Response Driver Training requiring additional workloads in training	1) The increase in course duration for Emergency Response Driver Training is likely to come in to force once section 19 of the road safety act changes. However, the duration for the new legislation is still unknown. therefore, be partially offset by the trainer to student ratio being changed 2) A review of driver trainer contracts is currently underway, by end of Q4 3) Monitor the impact over time to ensure that new entrants are able to undertake the relevant training and therefore are able to drive appliances, by end of Q4. 4) Options scoped to further supplement and support the driving school to meet the identified deficiencies, by end of Q4 5) Keep abreast of discussions and Home Office around legislation changes. Latest intel is that proposed changes do not seem to be imminent. NFCC are pushing back
8		Loss of Service Premises	An event or situation, malicious or non-malicious, that causes a partial or total loss of a fire service asset
	8b	Control room	Severe weather, physical or technical attack or failure, general damage to building, denial of access (e.g. Protests/ IA), failure of contracts with third party supplier (e.g. joint/co-located premises)	1) Involvement in NWFC governance structures to assure operations and BC arrangements 2) Involvement in NWFC BC arrangements and exercises 3) Active participation on NWFC BC Management Group Meetings 4) Monitor the upcoming testing of NWFC to secondary location and learnings
9		Failure to maximise opportunities	An event or situation that could provide an opportunity to improve the Service, which if not utilised could have a negative impact on the Service's progress
	9a	Technological advances	Failure to maximise the opportunities that technological advances present due to a lack of capacity within the ICT & Digital Technology (DT) department, and an inability of staff to keep pace with new developments that are implemented	1) Initiate and mature Community Developer concept 2) Continue to skill-up, train and educate users 3) Re-assigned key resource to progress a strategic technology workstream 4) Planned review of Digital, Data and Technology (DDaT) resource and structure to align & optimise resource, provide progression routes with succession planning and remove single points of failure 5) Executive Board will consider some investment into DDaT resource following the above exercise if provided with compelling evidence of risk reduction
10		Failure to manage incidents or staff conduct effectively, including inadequate handling of complaints or disciplinary processes, leading to loss of public confidence or reputational damage.	An incident or situation that results in loss of public or staff confidence due to employee conduct (in the workplace, personal life, or on social media), non-compliance with Service policies, the Core Code of Ethics, or Equality, Diversity and Inclusion (EDI) principles; compounded by negative media coverage or the Service's mismanagement of the response.
	10a	Failure to provide appropriate communications on events, situations or incidents that could lead to a loss of public confidence in LFRS	An event or situation relating to, loss of public or staff confidence due to Employee conduct at work, in personal life and on social media, failure to adhere to service policy/core code of ethics/ EDI and related negative press, or Sector events.	1) Social media sessions to be delivered jointly with HR to address corporate and personal use 2) E-learning module on use of social media to be created for all staff
	10b	Failure to implement appropriate people processes in response to staff misconduct or complaints.	Allegations or evidence of staff misconduct (e.g., bullying, harassment, discrimination). Failure to act in line with Service Values, Core Code of Ethics, Staff Code of Conduct, or service policy. Delays or inconsistencies in investigations or decision making. Lack of transparency or perceived fairness in internal procedures	1) Continue delivering training for all line managers on investigative best practices 2) Continue to strengthen and embed the quality assurance process for misconduct cases 3) Address adequate capacity/resource in HR or management which could delay case progress, by Q4 2026/27 4) Strengthening the professional standards function with the introduction of a dedicated Group Manager to support investigation processes
11		Operational	An event or situation that could impact on LFRS ability to respond effectively and efficiently.
	11a	Rapid external fire spread in high rise premises	An event or situation relating to lack of prevention, protection and operational response leading to a major incident.	1) Ongoing built environment awareness training for operation and community safety staff 2) High rise exercises involving staff from LFRS to be continued 3) On going regulatory activity to ensure remediation of flammable external wall systems and other areas of non-compliance 4) Implementation of activities identified through the Extra-Ordinary Operational Assurance Group (OAG) focusing on Grenfell Tower Phase 2 5) Implement actions arising the Hong Kong fire which identified external coverings that may lead to accelerated fire spread
	11b	Complete removal of Day Crewing Plus (DCP)	A challenge from a Union to current local agreement.	1) Ongoing engagement with staff and Trade Unions 2) Assess the impact of reverting some stations to DCP
	11c	Lack of required skills of operational staff	A situation where operational staff do not possess the required skill to operate safely at an incident	1) Monitor effectiveness of Operational Assurance Performance Report in disseminating information 2) Operational Assurance Officers to be mobilised to provide additional assurance at incidents that meet specific criteria, broadly when the risk to Firefighters is increased. For example, this includes operational discretion and critical incidents 3) LDC continue to work closely with Service Delivery to ensure attendance on Safety Critical mandatory training, monthly performance reports are sent to Head of Service Delivery (HoSD) 4) LDC trainers are skill graded to ensure they operate consistently in terms of identifying training needs. 5) Review of the internal quality assurance policy and inclusion of Station based assurance activity by qualified personnel in relation to training, by end of Q4
	11f	Retention, development, and recruitment of On Call staff	The failure to recruit and retain on-call staff caused by lack of on-call recruiting strategies, not being perceived as a desirable employer, not being competitive in pay rates, not providing enough flexibility to on-call staff with work arrangements.	1) Continuous programme of improvement to identify and make proposals across On Call (OC) aimed at improving recruitment, development and retention 2) Enhanced coordination between OCSO Team Leader (TL), HR, and Corporate comms on recruitment targeting 3) Wholetime Have a Go events to showcase OC role at targeted stations 4) Changes to development requirements, circa 50% reduction in evidence requirements 5) Look forward, plans for OC SM to review/develop; • Turn in / out arrangements • Maintenance of skills (level of demand) • Employer engagement 6) Moving On Call to the Page One pagers to remove geographical limitations to aid with recruitment catchment and allow for increased turn in times. 7) Pay as you go proposals being developed to enable more flexible contracts. 8) 365 recruitment and Area Hubs implemented. 9) Development of an On Call Service Order for signposting to the Service guidance. 10) Promote the hybrid working model 11) Look to expand green book hybrid working 12) Continue to implement the actions from the On Call academic study: The On Call Recruitment, Diversity and Skills software has been rolled out to improve On Call availability and performance - build on the training and development of OC Unit managers and SDMs with a development day. 13) Implement three person crewing proposals. 14) On Call remuneration further to National Joint Council (NJC) On Call Pay Review - now out for consultation. Consider expansion of this workstream to resolve issues around Time Off In Lieu (TOIL). 15) Review the On Call Support Officer (OCSO) Function and redistribution of workstreams to deliver he outcomes in an efficient way, by end of Q4/ 25-26
	11g	Replacement of the existing mobilising system as current solution comes to end of life	The failure to recruit and retain on-call staff caused by lack of on-call recruiting strategies, not being perceived as a desirable employer, not being competitive in pay rates, not providing enough flexibility to on-call staff with work arrangements.	1) Establishing the feasibility and cost of contract extension from current mobilising system supplier, pending legal advice and extension options which are being developed. By Q1 26/27 assurance will be gained on cost and timescales 2) Identifying options and contingencies for the delivery of the new mobilising system 3) Identify sources of additional budget 4) Continuation of director level engagement 5) Regular reporting via project board 6) Capture lessons learned 7) Ensure Project Team maintain engagement with supplier
	11i	Unauthorised access, criminal damage or theft from stations, vehicles, or operational equipment, including during periods when staff may be present on site.	A spate of break‑ins nationally targeting fire stations or vehicles, including when crew are present or nearby.	1) Review and update station security risk assessments for all premises 2) Prioritise investment in physical security enhancements at vulnerable or remote stations (e.g. lighting, Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV), alarms) 3) Explore procurement of equipment with tracking/remote-disable features 4) Issue refreshed guidance on securing vehicles and equipment during and outside of operational hours 5) Capture and share lessons learned from recent incidents and near misses 6) Strengthen local police engagement for enhanced patrols, crime trend awareness, and response planning 7) Agree a policy for accessing CCTV systems
	11j	Failing Pager messages	The failure of the Critico solution to notify on-call fire fighters of an incident.	1) Critico to rectify coverage issues 2) Critico to provide a detailed report outlining their change control procedures to ensure full scrutiny and governance rules are in place 3) LFRS to change testing time from 18:00 to a more suitable time 4) Increase LFRS testing after any Critco changes
12		General	An event or situation that could impact on LFRS
	12a	Major lack of effective Management of personal data	A situation or event caused by the lack of effective information management in LFRS	1) Procedure for ensuring appropriate retention of HR records.